Your rebuttal seems to be looking at an entirely different timeframe than Zoltan's Hypothesis as it concerns commodities and shipping. You state "One of the big losers in all of this is likely to be freight shipping: as China is likely to trade more with Russia the appeal of overland transport is going to be significant here both to avoid detection and ensure capacity." While a sensible conclusion, this infrastructure does not currently exist.
Building pipelines not yet announced is a decade long project. The latest Power of Siberia Pipeline, announced in 2007 first shipped gas in 2019 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_of_Siberia. Even PoS2 is fast tracked we are looking at 5+ years as a best case scenario.
Capacity on trucks and trains to move oil, coal, iron ore, bauxite is basically immaterial and ridiculously cost prohibitive unless the cost of ocean shipping triples. Therefore, even if the Zoltan thesis of commodity storage on ships does not play out, ocean freight rates are likely to surge due higher utilization of the existing fleet for long haul Black Sea and Baltic trade to China that would otherwise go short haul to Europe. Should ocean freight triple with no relief in sight, only THEN might it make sense to add rail capacity. I find this HIGHLY unlikely as it is still far cheaper to just build more ships - something China is very good at.
To sum up: trade dislocation with longer sailing distance will overwhelm finely balanced ship supply and demand sending freight rates much higher. Overland relief is immaterial and uneconomic outside of oil and gas pipelines which will take 5+ years to build. The economic solution is to build more ships but ship orderbooks for drybulk and tankers are at all time lows as a % of fleet and shipyards are full Through 2024 end. IF Russian commodities do end up going to Asia instead of the west, the world is structurally short on ship capacity until at least 2025, likely longer.
As someone who considers their expertise to lie in ocean freight, I would say Zoltan is spot on for the medium term about high ocean freight rates (~5 years) and any marginal pipeline capacity initiated due to recent events will take 5+ years to be built and have an impact which will be anticipated far in advance by new ship capital spending plans. There is still no sensible alternative for drybulk cargoes. The only scenario in which ocean shipping 'loses' as you suggest is if commodity shipments from Russia are curtailed, otherwise the trade dislocation is a huge boon for shipping as Zoltan suggests.
> Shipping costs will be prohibitive compared to the transit times from Qatar and from US Gulf Coast which both have ample supply at lower extraction costs compared to Woodside & Santos's costs in Australia.
"Zoltan’s trade recommendation on shipping names is poorly considered";
> Might he have been referring to increased demand for trans-Atlantic LNG cargoes ex-Gulf Coast ports (eg; Corpus Christi) to replace the supply Europe lost by canning Nord Stream 2?
Your rebuttal seems to be looking at an entirely different timeframe than Zoltan's Hypothesis as it concerns commodities and shipping. You state "One of the big losers in all of this is likely to be freight shipping: as China is likely to trade more with Russia the appeal of overland transport is going to be significant here both to avoid detection and ensure capacity." While a sensible conclusion, this infrastructure does not currently exist.
Building pipelines not yet announced is a decade long project. The latest Power of Siberia Pipeline, announced in 2007 first shipped gas in 2019 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_of_Siberia. Even PoS2 is fast tracked we are looking at 5+ years as a best case scenario.
Capacity on trucks and trains to move oil, coal, iron ore, bauxite is basically immaterial and ridiculously cost prohibitive unless the cost of ocean shipping triples. Therefore, even if the Zoltan thesis of commodity storage on ships does not play out, ocean freight rates are likely to surge due higher utilization of the existing fleet for long haul Black Sea and Baltic trade to China that would otherwise go short haul to Europe. Should ocean freight triple with no relief in sight, only THEN might it make sense to add rail capacity. I find this HIGHLY unlikely as it is still far cheaper to just build more ships - something China is very good at.
To sum up: trade dislocation with longer sailing distance will overwhelm finely balanced ship supply and demand sending freight rates much higher. Overland relief is immaterial and uneconomic outside of oil and gas pipelines which will take 5+ years to build. The economic solution is to build more ships but ship orderbooks for drybulk and tankers are at all time lows as a % of fleet and shipyards are full Through 2024 end. IF Russian commodities do end up going to Asia instead of the west, the world is structurally short on ship capacity until at least 2025, likely longer.
As someone who considers their expertise to lie in ocean freight, I would say Zoltan is spot on for the medium term about high ocean freight rates (~5 years) and any marginal pipeline capacity initiated due to recent events will take 5+ years to be built and have an impact which will be anticipated far in advance by new ship capital spending plans. There is still no sensible alternative for drybulk cargoes. The only scenario in which ocean shipping 'loses' as you suggest is if commodity shipments from Russia are curtailed, otherwise the trade dislocation is a huge boon for shipping as Zoltan suggests.
Where is the source of Zoltan Pozsar, that you are responsing?
"perhaps Australia ships LNG to Europe"
> Shipping costs will be prohibitive compared to the transit times from Qatar and from US Gulf Coast which both have ample supply at lower extraction costs compared to Woodside & Santos's costs in Australia.
"a man called Ma-ke Rui-she" ?
That's not Pin Yin for Elon Musk (x伊隆马斯克 Yī lóng mǎ sīkè).
So, it's Mark who?
"a man called Ma-ke Rui-she" ?
That's not Pin Yin for Elon Musk (x伊隆马斯克 Yī lóng mǎ sīkè).
So, it's Mark who?
"good network models for all the infrastructure"
> Perhaps, Daniel Yergin's The New Map: Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations is a good place to start?
https://www.amazon.com/New-Map-Energy-Climate-Nations/dp/B08MB71HW8/ref=sr_1_8?crid=3O0M4OSS7N48X&keywords=Oil+markets&qid=1646911522&s=books&sprefix=oil+markets%2Cstripbooks-intl-ship%2C732&sr=1-8
"Zoltan’s trade recommendation on shipping names is poorly considered";
> Might he have been referring to increased demand for trans-Atlantic LNG cargoes ex-Gulf Coast ports (eg; Corpus Christi) to replace the supply Europe lost by canning Nord Stream 2?